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Abstract
This article contributes to an understanding of how conditionality applies across social
security and immigration policies in restricting the access to social benefits of national citizens,
EU and non-EU citizens. Specifically, the article builds on Clasen and Clegg’s (2007) framework
of conditionality in the context of welfare state reform by extending that conceptual framework
to include migration. The framework is applied to examine how different levels of conditionality
have been implemented in UK policy reforms to restrict access to rights of residence and to
social benefits. It is argued that a conditionality approach moves beyond a binary of citizens
and migrants in social policy analysis, contributing to an understanding of the dynamics and
interactions of work-related conditions in restricting access to social benefits, with implications
for inequalities that cut across national, EU and non-EU citizens in terms of the relationship
of particular groups to the market.
Introduction
Debates about welfare states and migration are often framed by questions
regarding the relative exclusion of migrants from the social rights of citizenship,
including access to social benefits. Those debates have tended to centre on a
binary distinction between citizens and migrants, with citizens constructed as a
benchmark of inclusion against which the social rights of migrants are measured.
Migrants may be identified as foreign nationals – as ‘non-citizens’ of the country
to which they have migrated (for further discussion see Anderson and Blinder,
2014). However, citizens and non-citizens are not unitary groups regarding their
access to social rights. As feminist scholarship has underlined, citizenship can
exclude from ‘within’ as well as from ‘without’ (Lister, 2003). Policies towards
both citizens and non-citizens have increasingly restricted access to the rights
of citizenship or residence within a nation state, including entitlement to social
benefits, on the basis of paid work/economic independence.
As regards the social rights of citizens, access to social benefits has
been subject to increasing conditionality, underpinned by a market model of
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citizenship that assumes individual responsibility to participate in paid work and
self-provisioning through work (Bennett and Millar, 2009; Dwyer, 2004). Within
this context, work-related conditions, requiring benefits claimants to look for,
prepare for and take up available work, have been extended in terms of the groups
to which they apply, the type of conditions imposed, and the stringency of the
conditions, including the withdrawal of benefits as a penalty for non-compliance
(Dwyer and Wright, 2014).
At the same time, conditionality has also been implemented to restrict the
entry, residence and access to social benefits of non-citizens. Different conditions
apply to the citizenship and immigration status of particular groups, resulting in
differentiated modes of inclusion and exclusion (Carmel et al., 2011; Sainsbury,
2012). While EU countries have facilitated the migration of workers from within
and outside the EU, access to social benefits has been claimed to be a pull
factor for ‘unwanted’ migration (Geddes, 2003) – despite the lack of evidence
to support those claims (Corrigan, 2010; Dustmann and Frattini, 2014). In light
of this, proposals for restrictions on EU citizens’ access to social benefits have
been put forward by member states with higher levels of EU migrants, including
the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands (Ruhs, 2015). Indeed, the UK made those
restrictions central to its 2015/16 negotiations on the UK’s continued membership
of the EU.
While inequalities between citizens and migrants in access to social benefits
are evident in terms of entitlements to those benefits and, relatedly, benefits
receipt (Morrissens and Sainsbury, 2005), there has been limited analysis of
the ways in which conditionality restricts access. This article contributes to
an understanding of how work-related conditions implemented through policy
reforms restrict access to rights of residence and entitlement to social benefits
across national, EU and non-EU citizens. It thus contributes more broadly to
an understanding of the implications of conditionality for potentially extending
inequalities among, as well as between, national, EU and non-EU citizens in
terms of the relationship of particular groups to the market. It is argued that a
conditionality approach moves beyond a binary of citizens and migrants by
allowing for analysis of the dynamics and interactions of different types of
conditions in restricting access to rights of citizenship/residence and to social
benefits, while pointing to the ways in which a model of conditional rights
premised on work/economic independence has exclusionary implications for all.
The article is structured as follows. The first section considers the ways in
which work-related conditionality has been implemented in restricting citizens’
access to social benefits, drawing on Clasen and Clegg’s framework for analysing
different levels of conditionality relating to welfare reform (Clasen and Clegg,
2007). Section two develops and extends that conceptual framework to include
policy reform in relation to migration. The framework is then applied in sections
three and four to examine empirically how those levels of conditionality have been
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implemented through policy changes in the UK, and how they interconnect in
restricting EU and non-EU migrants’ access to rights of residence and entitlement
to social benefits. The analysis focuses on access to means-tested working-age
social benefits (benefits paid to those in work and those out of work). It examines
policy change in the UK over time, with a focus on recent reforms since 2010
under the Coalition/Conservative governments with respect to non-EU and EU
migrant workers. Analysis of the UK policy context allows for a focus on a country
where both EU and non-EU migrant workers have constituted a significant share
of migration inflows. EU and non-EU nationals accounted for 48 and 52 per cent
of non-British inflows in 2014, respectively. Among EU inflows, two thirds came
for work-related reasons while, among non-EU inflows, a quarter came for work-
related reasons, other main reasons being for study or family (Vargas-Silva and
Markaki, 2015). Within the EU, the UK also has the highest number of citizens of
the member states that joined the EU since 2004 and, after Germany, the highest
numbers of EU and non-EU citizens overall (Eurostat, 2015). Reference to EU
migrants in the UK refers to those who have rights as EU citizens under EU
law1. Reference to non-EU migrant workers in the UK refers to those who are
subject to UK immigration law2. The final section addresses the implications of
work-related conditionality for inequalities among, as well as between, national,
EU and non-EU citizens.
Work-related conditionality and access to social benefits
With the restructuring of welfare states and the pursuit of labour market
activation policies, citizens’ access to social benefits has become increasingly
conditional upon participation in activities which support entering or re-entering
paid work (Aurich, 2011; Dwyer, 2004). While access to social benefits has for long
entailed some form of conditionality, the economic crisis of 2008, it is argued,
critically undermined the principle that the market could be relied upon to
provide adequate incomes for all – for the subjects of labour market activation
policies (Marchal et al., 2014). Income from employment – the main source
of household income – fell in real terms in some OECD countries (including
Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, the UK, the USA) in the period 2007–2009, while
income from self-employment fell across most OECD countries (Jenkins et al.,
2013). While there were nominal and real increases in levels of minimum income
benefits in some European countries in the period 2008–2010, the conditions
attached to claiming those benefits were, notably, not relaxed and, in some
countries, intensified (Marchal et al., 2014).
Clasen and Clegg (2007) define the different ‘levels of conditionality’ that
have been implemented through policy changes across countries and within a
country over time. Those levels of conditionality have acted as a ‘lever’ for making
access to social benefits more or less restrictive (Clasen and Clegg, 2007). The first
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level of conditionality concerns ‘conditions of category’. Membership of a defined
category of benefits support is, as they note, socially constructed: certain groups
can be included or excluded according to changing definitions of a particular
category. Changes in guidance to welfare professionals on a particular category
(e.g. who is eligible for unemployment benefit) can thus be a lever for restricting
access to social benefits (e.g. excluding students). The second level of conditional-
ity concerns ‘conditions of circumstance’, which involve eligibility criteria applied
to a particular benefit, such as work-based criteria for contributory benefits and
need-based criteria for non-contributory benefits, both of which can be a lever
for determining and restricting access to social benefits. The third level concerns
‘conditions of conduct’, which apply after eligibility for a social benefit has been
determined. This level of conditionality has been the focus of more recent welfare
reforms, involving the obligation of benefits claimants to engage in work-related
activities as a condition of their ongoing entitlement – the emphasis being on the
work-related behaviour of the claimant as a condition of access.
In the UK, all three levels of conditionality are evident, and to some extent
interconnect, when considering the ways in which work-related conditionality
has intensified in terms of the social groups to which it applies and the stringency
of the conditions. Welfare reforms have extended work-related conditions to
groups claiming social benefits that would previously have been exempt from
those conditions. With respect to conditions of category, lone parents with children
aged five and over have now been included within the category of ‘job-seekers’
(the 2015 Welfare Reform and Work Bill proposes extending full work-related
requirements when a child is aged 3). Similar restrictions apply in some other
European countries (Knijn et al., 2007). Likewise, people with disabilities are now
subject to a work-capability assessment to determine the category of benefits to
which they are entitled (Patrick, 2011). By moving certain groups into different
benefits categories, with work-based eligibility criteria attached to particular
benefits, those groups have been required to comply with work-related conditions
of conduct. At the same time, there has been an increase in the use of sanctions
for failure to comply with conditions of conduct, such as failure to apply for a
job, removing the benefits of a claimant for specific periods of time (Watts et al.,
2014).
With the introduction of the Universal Credit system3, work-related
conditions of circumstance and conduct are to be extended further, applying
not only to benefits claimants who are not in work but to those in work. In-
work claimants will be subject to a ‘conditionality threshold’ regarding their
weekly earnings (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). Those whose earnings fall below
the threshold (equivalent to 35 hours at the national minimum wage) will be
required to undergo activities to increase their earnings by increasing their hours
of work and/or their wages (Universal Credit Policy Briefing No.12, 2011). Work-
related conditionality in the context of social security policy in the UK has
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thus sought to increase reliance on the market through a focus on individual
work-related behaviour, requiring not simply participation in paid work but a
particular number of hours of work/level of earnings. While cuts to expenditure
on working-age social benefits (in work and out-of-work benefits), and a cap
on total household benefits payments, have also been implemented since the
2008 crisis, which have restricted the level and coverage of benefits (Hood and
Phillips, 2015), the expansion and increasing severity of conditions of conduct
have likewise resulted in restriction ‘from within’ – the exclusion of national
citizens from access to benefits.
Migration and conditionality
Migrants’ access to social rights, including entitlements to social benefits, has been
fundamentally shaped by the immigration policy of nation states, in addition to
their welfare system (Sainsbury, 2012). Immigration and naturalisation policies
determine who is granted entry to a country; the conditions of admission to a
country, including access to the labour market and to social provisions; and the
conditions for acquiring permanent residence or citizenship within a country
(Baubock, 1994). In this section, Clasen and Clegg’s framework of conditionality
(2007) is extended to include policy reforms relating to migration. Clasen and
Clegg’s framework focuses on the levels of conditionality that apply to all with
respect to social benefits claims. The following analysis takes as its starting
point how these levels of conditionality apply in determining who has rights
of residence/citizenship to make those claims. It thus establishes a continuum
of the three levels of conditionality across immigration, citizenship and social
security policies, which can be applied to make access to rights of residence and
to social benefits more or less restrictive.
Conditions of category
In the context of immigration policy, conditions of category can be
distinguished as the categorisation of certain groups entering a nation state
as subject to immigration controls, and the categorisation of those groups
according to immigration status (e.g. as workers, students, family members or
asylum seekers). Those categories, like categories of social benefits support, reflect
changing definitions, which can include or exclude particular groups. As regards
the category of ‘worker’, since the late 1990s the immigration policies of OECD
countries have increasingly differentiated between categories of migrant workers
according to their assumed economic value, facilitating the admission of those
whose labour is assessed as being of high-value, while restricting the entry of
low-skilled workers (Beine et al., 2015; Ruhs, 2013; Ruhs and Anderson, 2010).
Immigration policies have also aimed to facilitate admission on the basis of
wealth, establishing entry routes specifically for investors (OECD, 2015).
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As regards migration from within the EU, the development of European
citizenship has granted EU citizens rights to free movement across the EU,
irrespective of economic status (Article 21(1), TFEU; Article 45, EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights). However, work-related conditions of category apply
with respect to which EU citizens have rights of residence in another member
state (Directive 2004/38/EC). Extended rights of residence, beyond three months
of entry, are conferred on those who are defined as workers, self-employed,
jobseekers, or self-sufficient (including students), and their family members –
self-sufficient being defined as those who ‘have sufficient resources for themselves
not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State’
(Article 7, 1(b), Directive 2004/38/EC). While the definition of a ‘worker’, which
rests on EU case law, is a broad definition, based on paid employment (Case 66/85
Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Wu¨rttemberg [1986] ECR 2121) and activities which
are ‘genuine and effective’ (Case 53/81 Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982]
ECR 1035), in addition to excluding those engaged in unpaid work/care, how a
worker is defined in practice may potentially be more or less restrictive.
Conditions of circumstance
Conditions of circumstance concern the eligibility criteria for: i) entry and
temporary residence in a country (e.g. as a worker); ii) entitlement to claim
social benefits; and iii) acquisition of permanent residence or citizenship. Those
conditions can further restrict who has rights of residence, and under what terms
and conditions.
First, the work-based criteria for the admission and temporary residence of
non-EU migrant workers can be more or less restrictive. Since the 2008 economic
crisis, which has had varying effects on international migration (Tilly, 2011), some
European countries (e.g. Germany), in seeking to attract workers for particular
occupations, have implemented measures to make the admission of high-skilled
non-EU workers less restrictive while others (e.g. the Netherlands and the UK)
have introduced more restrictive measures, including requiring employers to
demonstrate proof of earnings for those admitted as high-skilled workers (OECD,
2015).
Second, the residence-based criteria for determining entitlement to claim
social benefits on the basis of residence can be more or less restrictive. In
some countries, such as Sweden, access to social benefits is granted to non-
EU migrants on the basis of one year of legal residence, be it temporary or
permanent (European Migration Network, 2013). In others, such as Germany and
the Netherlands, non-EU migrants who have temporary residence are also, in
principle, entitled to some social benefits. However, claiming those benefits can be
used as grounds for non-renewal of residence status and for refusing applications
for permanent residence, the eligibility criteria for permanent residence in effect
restricting access to social benefits (Morris, 2001; Mu¨ller et al., 2014). In other
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countries, such as the UK, permanent residence is required of most non-EU
migrants to claim social benefits, the conditions of access to permanent residence
thus being a lever for restricting access to those provisions.
While EU migrants residing in another member state are entitled to claim
social benefits (Article 34(2), EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), residence-
based criteria may also potentially restrict access. Access to non-contributory
social benefits on the basis of place of ‘habitual residence’ involve a broad range
of criteria for determining place of habitual residence (Article 11, Regulation
987/2009/EC), which may be more or less restrictive. At the same time, the
criteria for determining if an EU migrant has rights of residence in another
member state under EU law, e.g. as a ‘worker’, may be more or less restrictive.
Third, a range of criteria may apply in determining eligibility for permanent
residence or citizenship in a country (International Organization for Migration,
2009). While developments at the EU level have sought to harmonise the rights
to permanent residence of non-EU citizens – requiring member states to grant
permanent residence after five years of continuous legal residence (Directive
2003/109/EC) – work-related conditions of circumstance restrict who has access
to those rights. Non-EU citizens must demonstrate economic independence by
having stable and regular resources, sufficient to live ‘without recourse to the
social assistance system of the member state concerned’ (Article 5, 1(a), Directive
2003/109/EC). With respect to the UK (the focus of the following section), these
provisions do not apply – indeed, the UK has taken a highly selective approach
to participating in EU immigration and asylum policy (Costello and Hancox,
2014). Access to permanent residence in the UK has been marked by a tightening
of both work-related conditions of category and circumstance, as the following
section examines.
Conditions of conduct
Conditions of category and circumstance may indirectly require migrants
to adhere to conditions of conduct – to certain types of behaviour, activity
and relationships – in order to enter, reside, access social benefits, permanent
residence or citizenship in a country. Migrant workers whose visa is tied to their
employer are dependent on maintaining a relationship with that employer for
their residence status (Anderson, 2010). Where workers are in principle entitled
to change employer, they may still decide to stay with an employer and accept
particular working conditions in order to meet the required duration of legal
residence to apply for permanent residency (Shutes, 2012). Likewise, where
economic independence is a condition of eligibility for permanent residence,
migrants may be reluctant to claim social benefits even if they are, in principle,
entitled to do so. Analysis of the ‘civic integration’ programme in the Netherlands,
in which non-EU migrants are required to participate as part of the process of
applying for permanent residence, highlights the ways in which self-sufficient
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behaviour is emphasised through the programme as an implicit condition for
inclusion in Dutch society (Suvarierol, 2015).
While in principle EU citizens automatically have a right to permanent
residence after five years of continuous legal residence in another member state
(Article 16, Directive 2004/38/EC), access to permanent residence requires the EU
citizen to have been able to reside over that period as a worker, self-employed or
self-sufficient person (or their family member). Thus, work-related conditions
of conduct – e.g. staying in work, as opposed to simply duration of residence –
may in effect restrict access to permanent residence.
Non-EU migrants, residence and access to social benefits
in the UK
This section examines how these different levels of conditionality have been
implemented through policy changes in the UK in restricting the entry, residence
and access to social benefits of non-EU migrant workers. While those changes
have, over time, made access to social benefits for most non-EU migrants in the
UK exclusive to those granted permanent residence, the analysis highlights the
ways in which recent reforms, with respect to non-EU migrant workers, have
served to further tighten the conditions determining which workers have access
to rights of permanent residence.
Conditions of category have increasingly restricted entry to the UK. Under the
1948 British Nationality Act, Commonwealth citizens (from the former colonies)
were still granted broadly the same rights as citizens of the UK and the colonies in
the post-war period of migration to the UK (Spencer, 2011). The 1971 Immigration
Act introduced restrictions on the rights of entry of Commonwealth citizens, re-
categorising migrants from these countries as subject to immigration controls.
From the late 1990s, immigration policy selectively opened up the entry of migrant
workers from outside the EU on the basis of their perceived contribution to
the economy (Morris, 2007). With the aim of competing for skilled non-EU
migrant workers, the points-based immigration system was introduced in 2008,
increasingly differentiating between categories of non-EU migrant workers on
the basis of skill/income (Home Office, 2006; Spencer, 2011). Following the
introduction of the system, the category for the potential entry of low-skilled
workers (Tier 3) was suspended. As regards the category of ‘skilled workers’
permitted entry (Tier 2), the introduction of quotas in 2011 placed further limits
on the entry of higher skilled workers (Home Office, 2015).
As regards entitlement to social benefits in the UK, conditions of category
and circumstance have both been levers for restricting access. The national
provisions of the post-war welfare state, including the introduction of National
Assistance, were not exclusive to citizens of the UK. The provision of non-
contributory supplementary benefit was, under the 1966 Social Security Act,
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made available to anyone in the UK, irrespective of nationality or length of
residence, subject to the same eligibility criteria (Feldman, 2003). However, access
to social benefits became increasingly restricted, first, through the categorisation
of Commonwealth citizens as subject to immigration controls under the 1971
Immigration Act (Solomos, 2003), and second, by making ‘no recourse to public
funds’ (no entitlement to non-contributory social benefits) a condition of entry
for those subject to immigration controls (Sainsbury, 2012). At the same time, in
the case of asylum seekers, who remained entitled to some means-tested social
benefits, legislative changes in the 1990s increasingly restricted access by making
asylum seekers ineligible for mainstream benefits, introducing a separate system
of asylum support, with reduced and more restrictive types of provision (Sales,
2002).
As non-EU migrants subject to immigration controls generally have ‘no
recourse to public funds’ (unless granted humanitarian protection), access to
permanent residence or citizenship has been the basis for acquiring entitlements
to social benefits in the UK. Data on grants of settlement (permanent residence)
in the UK indicate an upward trend over the past 20 years, with permanent
residence on the basis of work (regarding applications from non-EU workers and
their dependants) becoming the most frequent category since 2008, representing
48 per cent of grants of settlement in 2012 compared with 17 per cent in 1997
(Blinder, 2014). Over that period, immigration reforms have restricted access to
permanent residence by extending the required duration of legal residence in the
UK to be eligible to apply. In addition, since 2010, different levels of conditionality
have been implemented to further restrict access to permanent residence for those
not deemed to be of ‘high value’ to the economy.
First, in terms of conditions of category, the range of workers that have an
entitlement to apply for permanent residence has been reduced. Only those who
are categorised as ‘high-value’ (Tier 1, including entrepreneurs) and ‘skilled’
(Tier 2) are entitled to apply for permanent residence after five years in the
UK. Domestic workers are among those who have been excluded from access
to permanent residence (Home Office, 2012). Second, regarding conditions of
circumstance, the eligibility criteria for permanent residence have become more
restrictive in relation to work, with the aim of ‘breaking the link between work and
settlement, so that only those who contribute the most economically will be able
to stay long-term’ (Prime Minister David Cameron, 25 March 2013). A ‘genuine
entrepreneur test’ has been extended to assess the eligibility of entrepreneurs
(under Tier 1) to apply for permanent residence (HC 1025, 26 February 2015).
A minimum salary threshold will also be introduced in 2016, requiring non-
EU skilled workers (under Tier 2) to have a minimum salary of £35,000 to be
eligible to apply (HC 1039, 14 March 2013). This is a higher level of pay than the
salary required for temporary admission to the UK as a non-EU skilled worker
(£20,300), and a higher level of pay than the median gross annual earnings of all
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(full-time) workers in the UK (£27,200 in 2014) (Office for National Statistics,
2014).
Work-related conditions of circumstance have also been tightened for the
admission of non-EU family members, requiring the applicant to have a
minimum gross annual income of £18,600 for a non-EU spouse/partner to join
them, and an additional amount for children (HC 194, 13 June 2012). Based on
the earnings of a sample of applicants, it was estimated that just under half would
have failed to meet the new income criteria (Migration Advisory Committee,
2011). Among non-EU workers and non-EU family members, these levels of
conditionality have thus restricted access to rights of residence, and entitlement
to social benefits, to those who are least likely, in terms of their status in the
market, to be in need of those provisions. A wider set of immigration policy
changes (Immigration Act 2014; Immigration Bill 2015–16) have, more broadly,
extended migration controls from within the UK.
EU migrants, residence and access to social benefits in the UK
While EU citizens, in principle, have rights to enter, reside and claim social
benefits in the UK and other European countries on the basis of EU citizenship,
different levels of conditionality have been implemented in the UK as a means
of restriction ‘from within’: restricting EU migrants’ access to rights of residence
and social benefits.
Following EU enlargement, the UK was among those countries that did
not impose transitional restrictions on the entry of A8 workers (citizens of the
eight Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004).
Those who registered as ‘workers’ were entitled to reside, with full access to in-
work benefits and child benefit, while access to out-of-work benefits required
one year of continuous employment in the UK. Since EU enlargement, and
particularly since the lifting of transitional restrictions on the migration of A8
nationals (in 2011) and A2 nationals (citizens of Bulgaria and Romania, which
joined the EU in 2007), work-related conditions of category and circumstance
have increasingly been applied in the UK to restrict EU citizens’ access to social
benefits.
In 2004 a ‘right to reside’ test was introduced, which requires EU migrants
to demonstrate that they have a legal right to reside in the UK under EU law – as
a worker/self-employed person or jobseeker (or their family member) – in order
to be eligible to claim social benefits (SI 2006/1003; SI 2006/1026)4. The test is in
addition to the ‘habitual residence’ requirements, which apply to all individuals
who have come/returned to the UK (within the last two years), including UK
citizens (SI 2014/902). With the lifting of transitional restrictions on A2 nationals
in 2014, the conditions of circumstance for determining habitual residence and a
‘right to reside’ in social benefits claims have become increasingly restrictive. In
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279416000234
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 178.203.234.106, on 20 Jul 2017 at 11:44:01, subject to the Cambridge Core
work-related conditionality accessing benefits 701
addition to a minimum of three months residence (SI 2013/3196), a minimum
earnings threshold has been introduced in guidance on assessing if an EU citizen is
a worker/self-employed (Department for Work and Pensions, 2015; HM Revenue
and Customs, 2014). This requires those out of work (who retain worker status,
under EU law, if they are made involuntarily unemployed) to have been earning
for the past three months at the level at which National Insurance contributions
are paid (£153 a week in 2014–15, equivalent to working 24 hours a week at the
national minimum wage). Those who do not meet this earnings threshold are
subject to an assessment as to whether their work can be considered ‘genuine and
effective’ under EU law (Department for Work and Pensions, 2015; HM Revenue
and Customs, 2014; see O’Brien, 2015, on the extent to which these measures are
compatible with EU law).
Work-related conditions of circumstance have also been a lever for restricting
access to social benefits for EU migrants with rights of residence as ‘jobseekers’
under EU law. Following legislative changes in 2014, those claiming income-based
Jobseekers Allowance are subject to a ‘genuine prospect of work test’ after three
months, losing their benefits entitlement unless they can provide ‘compelling
evidence’ that they are continuing to seek employment and have ‘a genuine chance
of being engaged’ (Memo DMG 2/15; SI 2013/3032, Regulation 6)5. Guidance on
what constitutes ‘compelling evidence’ of finding work involves stricter work-
related conditions of conduct than those that apply to UK citizens claiming benefits
as jobseekers, requiring either an offer of a job that is ‘genuine and effective work’
and due to start in three months (in which case benefits entitlement can be
extended until the job commences), or a change of circumstances, such as re-
location, that has resulted in job interviews (in which case entitlement may be
extended for up to two months) (Memo DMG 2/15). With the introduction
of the Universal Credit system, more restrictive conditions of category will be
introduced, as a result of which ‘jobseekers’ will be excluded from entitlement to
claim Universal Credit (SI 2015/546).
There are no data on the proportion of benefits claims of EU nationals refused
on the basis of failing the right to reside test. However, there have been a number
of cases in the UK and European Courts concerning EU citizens residing in the
UK, including those who have been working in the UK, whose benefits claims
have been refused on grounds that they do not have a ‘right to reside’ as a worker
or jobseeker (see Widmann, 2013). The case of Saint Prix v Secretary of State for
Work and Pensions illustrates the dynamics and interactions of these levels of
conditionality in shaping the access to social benefits of EU migrants. Jessy Saint
Prix, a French citizen, had her claim for means-tested Income Support in the UK
refused on the basis that she was not defined as a ‘worker’. She had previously
worked as a teaching assistant while studying for a teaching qualification in the
UK, during which time she became pregnant. She subsequently took up agency
work, working in nurseries, but stopped this work as it was too demanding in the
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latter stages of her pregnancy. Her claim for Income Support after her baby was
born was refused on the basis that she did not have a ‘right to reside’ in the UK as
she was not a ‘worker’ (she was considered to have voluntarily stopped working,
therefore not retaining the status of worker) (2012 UKSC 49).
Conditions of category (being defined as a worker with a right to reside) and
work-related conditions of circumstance (not leaving a job ‘voluntarily’, thereby
losing the status of worker) interconnect in terms of the exclusion of Saint Prix
from access to social benefits in the UK. The refusal of her claim was challenged
and eventually the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled in favour of
Saint Prix in 2014 regarding the interpretation of the status of worker, ruling that
‘a woman who gives up work, or seeking work, because of the physical constraints
of the late stages of pregnancy and the aftermath of childbirth retains the status
of “worker” [ . . . ] provided she returns to work or finds another job within
a reasonable period after the birth of her child’ (C-507/12). While the ruling
recognised the rights of EU citizens to retain their status as ‘worker’ during
(gendered) periods of time not in paid work due to childbirth, work-related
conditions of conduct are imposed in order to retain this status. Returning to work
or taking up another job within a ‘reasonable period’ is defined in relation to
national legislation on the duration of maternity leave (paragraph 42, C-507/12).
This period of leave is likewise defined as a maximum of 12 months without
affecting the five years of residence in a member state that is a requirement for
permanent residence (paragraph 45, C-507/12). The EU migrant whose ‘right to
reside’ depends on being a worker is thus obligated to return to work or become a
jobseeker within a year of childbirth (according to UK statutory maternity leave)
in order to access social benefits. As a jobseeker, if she fails to demonstrate a ‘gen-
uine prospect of work’ after three months, through a job offer, she potentially loses
her entitlement to social benefits. Moreover, she risks losing an entitlement to
permanent residence in the long term by not re-entering work within this period.
Discussion and conclusion: implications of work-related
conditionality
Different levels of conditionality apply across social security, immigration and
citizenship policies in making access to rights of residence and entitlement to
social benefits more or less restrictive. A conditionality approach facilitates a
less static picture of rights on the basis of citizenship and immigration status,
allowing for analysis of the dynamics and interactions of those different levels
in restricting access to social rights across different groups. A focus on those
dynamics thus moves beyond a binary of citizens and migrants in social policy
analysis, pointing to the implications of a model of conditional rights premised
on work/economic independence for potentially increasing inequalities among,
as well as between, those groups.
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In the context of UK policy reforms, work-related conditions have restricted
access to social benefits across national, EU and non-EU citizens, with the dual
purpose of controlling migration and reducing welfare expenditure. Conditions
of category – being defined as an EU ‘worker’ or a non-EU ‘skilled worker’ –
interconnect with increasingly restrictive conditions of circumstance to make not
simply work but work with a minimum level of earnings a condition for access to
rights of residence/permanent residence as an EU or non-EU worker. These levels
of conditionality have implicitly imposed work-related conditions of conduct on
the EU and non-EU citizen in order to access rights of residence as workers. The
non-EU skilled worker must acquire a salary of £35,000 to be able to apply for
permanent residence. The EU worker must provide evidence that they have a
minimum level of earnings or have been in ‘genuine and effective work’ to be
recognised as a worker with a right to reside and claim social benefits. At the same
time, those claiming social benefits (both citizens and non-citizens) are subject
to increasingly restrictive conditions of conduct that make not simply work but a
minimum level of earnings an individual responsibility.
Work-related conditionality, in restricting access to rights of residence and
entitlement to social benefits, has implications for differentiated economic and
social outcomes among migrant groups, defined not simply by their status as EU
or non-EU citizens but by their (gendered) labour, income and wealth. Restricted
access to social benefits has generated forms of ‘categorical inequality’ as regards
not only whether migrants (and which groups of migrants) can participate in the
labour market, and under what conditions, but the extent to which they must
be entirely dependent on their labour (McGovern, 2012), and thus at greater
risk of poverty. Indeed, differences in levels of poverty between national, EU
and non-EU citizens are found to be greatest in European countries that have
implemented more restrictive conditions on access to permanent residence for
non-EU citizens – with higher levels of poverty among non-EU migrants in those
countries (Corrigan, 2014). At the same time, for those who are able to access
rights of residence and claim social benefits, the withdrawal of benefits for failure
to comply with work-related conditions has put particular groups at greater risk
of poverty. Benefits claimants who have been subject to sanctions are among the
most disadvantaged groups in relation to the labour market (Griggs and Evans,
2010).
Conditionality in immigration and social security policies also has
implications for the distribution of the costs of meeting welfare needs. In the
USA, welfare reforms that restricted the entitlement of permanent residents to
federal programmes of social assistance for the first five years of permanent legal
residence were associated with increasing levels of poverty among permanent
residents (Broder and Blazer, 2011). Many state authorities, however, used local
state-funded provision to support those made ineligible for federally-funded
assistance, though cuts at the local level placed those provisions at risk (Broder
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and Blazer, 2011). In the UK, restricting access to social benefits for non-EU
and EU migrants has also shifted the costs of meeting welfare needs to the local
level, with non-EU migrants who have ‘no recourse to public funds’ as well as
EU migrants denied a ‘right to reside’ dependent on limited local provisions
and informal support (Price and Spencer, 2015). At the same time, the use of
sanctions, withdrawing the benefits of claimants for failure to comply with work-
related conditions, has made those who are, in principle, entitled to national
state-funded provisions dependent on sources of informal support, including
food banks (Perry et al., 2014).
Public debate on welfare in the UK has been marked by myths about ‘us
and them’: ‘We are always in work, pay our taxes and get nothing from the state.
They are a welfare-dependent underclass, pay nothing to the taxman, and get
everything from the state’ (Hills, 2014: 1). While the latter quote refers to myths
in relation to citizens – to divisions between the ‘hard-working’ vs the ‘benefit-
scrounging’ citizen – it could equally apply to myths in relation to citizens vs
migrants (e.g. see Cook et al., 2012). Levels of public expenditure on working-
age social benefits, and receipt of those benefits (7.2 per cent of claimants were
estimated to be non-UK citizens in 2015) (DWP, 2015), need to be framed in
terms of the wider social and economic goals of welfare states in addressing
the dynamics of welfare needs across population groups, during periods in and
out of work over the life course (see Hills, 2014). Restricting access to social
benefits, for those in low-paid work and those not in work, both through cuts
and increasing conditionality, through social security and immigration policy,
disproportionately affects more disadvantaged groups among citizens and non-
citizens in terms of their relationship to the market. Over the long term, it
potentially risks undermining the role of welfare provisions in relation to both
social and economic goals.
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Notes
1 Including citizens of the European Economic Area.
2 Non-EU citizens have rights to free movement under EU law if they are the family members of
EU citizens, in addition to protections under immigration and asylum policy developments.
The UK has opted out of various measures on the rights of non-EU citizens (see Costello
and Hancox, 2014). Reference to non-EU citizens/migrants in this article does not include
non-EU migrants who are reliant on EU law, unless otherwise specified.
3 The Universal Credit system replaces various working-age benefits and tax credits with a
single benefit and assessment process (Department for Work and Pensions, 2010).
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279416000234
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 178.203.234.106, on 20 Jul 2017 at 11:44:01, subject to the Cambridge Core
work-related conditionality accessing benefits 705
4 The ‘right to reside test’ applies to means-tested benefits (Income Support, income-
based Jobseeker’s Allowance, income-related Employment and Support Allowance, Housing
Benefit, Pension Credit, Council Tax Reduction, Universal Credit, Child Benefit and Child
Tax Credit). The European Commission concluded that the right to reside test in the UK
is discriminatory against EU citizens from other member states (as it does not apply to UK
citizens) and referred the UK to the Court of Justice of the European Union in June 2014 (the
case is ongoing).
5 EU citizens with a right to reside as a ‘jobseeker’ are also no longer entitled to claim Housing
Benefit (SI 2014/539).
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